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Abstract: Interreligious and intercultural dialogue is supposed to be the best way to solve the conflicts arising from rival 
religious hermeneutics and different modes to conceive the ideal of a good life in contemporary multicultural and 
pluralistic societies. In regard to communicative or dialogical reason, respectful coexistence can be reached only by 
argumentative communication between interested people. In this sense, only rational arguments, strong enough to pass 
the test of the shared rationality can be valid at a discursive level. However, Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas and 
Catholic theologian Johann Baptist Metz challenge symmetrical and rational-based dialogue in order to postulate an 
asymmetrical relationship by giving voice to the other. For them, the core of interreligious and intercultural engagement 
does not start from rational agreements as Habermas, for instance, has proposed; but from prophetic and anamnestic 
reasons. This analytical and comparative presentation will show the possibilities of anamnestic reason and religion as 
service against dialogical reason in intercultural and interreligious contexts. Levinas’s and Metz’s criticism of dialogical 
reason opens new perspectives which contribute to reflection for both political theology and political philosophy. 
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Introduction 
ne of the relevant characteristics of contemporary societies is the coexistence of cultural 
and religious pluralities and therefore, the coexistence of different ways of relating to 
God and conceiving the ideal of a good life. It is commonly held that faith provides 
meaning for life and cultural roots for many people, but sometimes customs and beliefs derived 
from cultural traits can lead to suspicion, discrimination and segregation. This is the reason that 
multicultural societies experience the challenge to find the best way towards a respectful and 
fruitful way to live together. In this regard, the following questions arise: How to deal with the 
difficulty of inter-religious and inter-cultural coexistence so that different religious hermeneutics 
do not result in violence and discrimination? How to build scenarios of inclusion, collaboration 
and integration? How can mutual respect beyond dogmatic concepts that ground religious 
traditions be achieved? To respond to these questions, this discussion will show the possibilities 
of the prophetic reason that challenge the intersubjective-symmetrical relationship by giving 
priority to the other. Emmanuel Levinas’s and Johann Baptist Metz’s criticism of dialogical 
reason opens new perspectives which contribute to reflection for both political theology and 
political philosophy. 
Tolerance was the answer to eliminate cruelty in the relations between different faiths in the 
violent wars of religion in Europe during the XVI and XVII centuries. Tolerance has also been 
the grounds for dialogue and also the most important scenario that activists (both political and 
religious) and thinkers have found to overcome conflicts and to find similarities that help 
religious and cultural communities understand each other. Generally speaking, dialogue takes 
place in an inter-personal encounter with the aim of reaching an understanding that favours 
scenarios of consensus and harmony (Habermas 1985, Rorty 1992, Gadamer 2004).  
Dialogical proceduralism, however, has been challenged by theologian Johann Baptist Metz 
and philosopher Emmanuel Levinas from the perspective of the prophetic reason. The Prophetic 
rationality is a mode of thinking coming from the Judaic wisdom that grants a privilege to the 
external other and philosophically attempts to defend the place of the other in the ethical 
relationship. This is a post idealistic and post ontological way thinking that claims the Jewish 
heritage as primary and fundamental in relation to Greek-philosophical heritage in the Western 
world. 
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The following discussion examines the possibility of building a new form of understanding 
regarding religious and cultural encounters based on the prophetic rationality. To do so, the 
discussion starts from the perspective of (i) the dialogue or communicative reason (ii) to examine 
the proposals put forward by Metz and (iii) Levinas, with the purpose of (iv) pointing out ideas 
from Levinas and Metz that could support cultural and religious understanding.  
Communication between Religious Worlds in a Multicultural Society 
The dialogue between cultures and religions has been an important source of discussion for both 
philosophers and religious thinkers. From a theological perspective, at least from the 1960’s of 
the XX century, the number of ecumenical networks, documents, books and inter-religious 
meetings has been gradually growing. Swiss theologian Hans Küng is one of the leaders of this 
ecumenical movement. He considers that only through achieving peace between religions is it 
possible for there to be peace in the world. Kung claims that religions “should stress what they 
have in common more strongly than what divides them” (1993, xviii). He is convinced that 
dialogue is the best way to reach this objective. In addition, from a philosophical standpoint, the 
place of religion in contemporary societies has also been an object of discussion in seeking to 
answer two questions: whether religion has relevance in the public sphere and therefore, whether 
religion has the epistemological tools for discussion between religious and non-religious citizens 
in a liberal society, and, in the second place, how to respect different religious perspectives in a 
pluralistic and multicultural society.  
Jürgen Habermas, one of the most influential contemporary philosophers, points to a 
procedural instrument of dialogue based on human rights in order to build a transnational-
integrated global society. Habermas considers that it is time to take steps towards a multicultural-
liberal constitution that does justice to an increasingly culturally-diverse society. Basic human 
rights are universally valid and rationally motivated and, according to Habermas, they are the 
grounding for a fruitful dialogue in order to reach consensus and “weak agreements” about 
justice in multicultural societies (Habermas 2008b, 14).  
In terms of religious and cultural understanding, this proceduralism rests upon two cognitive 
assumptions: (i) everyone involved in the dialogue must consider the controversial topics from 
their own standpoint and also from that of the other participants; and (ii) only universalising 
arguments count in this dialogue, that is, arguments that could convince everyone irrespective of 
religious and cultural backgrounds. While the first assumption considers the mutual respect and 
cooperative attitude of the participants in the dialogue, the second points to a rational universe of 
discourse that allows participants to limit themselves to arguments which are potentially 
consensual. As a consequence of these dialogical conditions an ideologically neutral agreement 
could be reached, and therefore a secular level of understanding (Habermas 2008b, 11).  
Therefore, in regard to communicative or dialogical reason, respectful coexistence can be 
reached only by argumentative communication between interested people. In this sense, only 
rational arguments, strong enough to pass the test of the shared rationality can be valid at 
discursive level. Questions arise, therefore, about the risks of dialogical reason. In the first place, 
the risk of rhetoric and instrumentalization is always present (Salvarani 2011), and in particular, 
as is the failure to take into account the weak, the victims and those who cannot argue or are not 
present (Metz 1998).  
According to Metz, this communicative reason is not enough to universalize justice and 
solidarity. This is because communicative reason only accepts what is metabolizable in a shared 
rationality and fails to take into account the weak, the victims and those who cannot argue or are 
not present. That is, when facing questions from victims who have suffered an unjust violence, 
consensus or horizontal communication is worth very little; what matters is to respond to their 
suffering and injustice. The reason of the defeated is a cry, a denunciation, a demand for justice, 
and its strength comes from the experience of injustice and not from communication or 
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persuasive power. This is the anamnestic rationality, akin to Benjamin’s Eingedenken, that is, the 
memory of the victims (die Leidensgeschichte) rather than the winners. The universality of 
responsibility arises from this memory, and becomes the greatest asset of monotheism. 
Concerning the possibility of a multicultural-integrated society, a new inquiry arises: might 
the suffering of the victims bring diverse religious and cultural worlds together? For Habermas, 
integration is only opened by a communicative interaction, as stated above. If, on the contrary, 
according to Habermas, each culture is supposed to exist for itself as a semantically sealed 
whole, cut off from dialogues with other cultures, this integration would not be possible as a 
result of the semantic closure of immeasurable worldviews. However, Metz considers that a 
different way of integration is possible and, therefore, the communicative action no longer has 
the last word.  
The Authority of the Victims 
Metz considers cultural and religious pluralism one of the “discussions of the times” to which 
political theology has to offer relevant reflection (Metz 1999, 227). In the face of pluralism, Metz 
uncovers an aporia in contemporary society. While any attempt to universalise is seen as 
totalitarian and anti-pluralistic, the solution for the problems of the techno-scientific reason lies 
beyond the capacity of the individual. For this reason, he formulates the following question: 
“given the undeniable diversity of cultural and religious worlds, is there still a universal binding 
and thus plausible criterion for understanding?” (Metz 1999, 228).  
As stated above, Habermas finds that dialogical communication, in which partners can share 
arguments and reach a consensus in a symmetric position through a dialectic process, is the way 
to any possible understanding. If this way is closed, the alternative for Habermas is a solution à la 
Carl Schmitt that is the constitution of a powerful and decisionistic state to hold back the danger 
of war (Habermas 2008b, 13; Schmitt 1991). The way of understanding however is open, 
according to Metz, and Carl Schmitt does not have the last word in the face of the 
incommensurability of worldviews.  
Universal Binding and Criterion for Understanding 
Via criticizing the two different modes to respond to the problem of multiculturalism, Metz 
reacts to the aporia of pluralism and universalism from the religious roots themselves. In the first 
place, Habermas’s dialectic-discursive encounter is insufficient and proceduralism shows a dark 
shadow, according to Metz. This dark shadow has to do with the contemporaneity and symmetry 
of interlocutors in order to reach a universal consensus (Metz 1998, 142; 2005, 286-87). In fact, 
dialectic discourse is based on the structure of mutual recognition and exchange and, in this 
sense, discourse participates both in Hegelian’s idealism of the transcendental equal status of the 
partners and in the enlightened society of exchange. Secondly, in Western cultural circles many 
people favour a religion without God (Metz 1998, 155-56; 1999, 229). Even though this 
approach seems to be a softer and more tolerant religious paradigm that is appropriate for this 
pluralistic age, Metz takes issue with it in order to postulate grounding from the religious 
traditions themselves. 
Furthermore, Metz is clear that universal moralism is not the result of basic consensus or 
minimal meanings, as has been stated by theologian Hans Kung. According to Kung, in the face 
of the incommensurability of worldviews, the purpose of religious dialogue is to find a basic 
consensus that roots global ethos and therefore reach an agreement on the common values that 
could be meaningful for all religions. However, neither Habermas's or Apel’s argumentative 
competence nor Kung’s basic consensus are strong enough to universally bind interreligious 
understanding. Metz considers that only in an asymmetrical relationship would a fruitful 
interreligious and intercultural mode of life be possible.  
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The Authority of Those Who Suffer 
Being that consensus and argumentative competence are insufficient reasons for the imperative 
necessity of the universal binding for religious togetherness, Metz’s political theology has to 
consider an authority that has to be acknowledged by all religions. This is the authority of those 
who suffer as innocents, unjustly. The struggle for justice can generate a “horizontal horizon” in 
which religions can encounter themselves resisting unjust suffering. In this horizon an indirect 
ecumenism of religions is defined by Metz.  
Looking at the place suffering has in Metz’s political theology is basic for comprehending 
the significance of indirect ecumenism. The authority of those who suffer is so strong that the 
basis of all morality could be lost when the obedience to discourse and communication has 
primacy over the suffering, and therefore “this authority can no longer be shaped by 
hermeneutics or be safe by discussion” (Metz 1999b, 232). This authority is a source of meaning 
for ethics and, therefore, for individual and institutional behaviour. In fact, the obedience to this 
authority tests the righteousness of any ethics that do not want to become “ethics of 
accommodation” or justification, meaning an ethic “that seeks to reconciliate human actions with 
everchanging practical circumstances” (Metz 1999, 232). This authority, furthermore, makes 
universal human rights possible, which is regarded by Habermas as basic for universal religious 
understanding, and cultural differences can be tied to one another to avoid the eruption of more 
violence. 
The authority of the suffering takes the form of memory. This memory is a different 
rationality that is a different mode of thinking with a different origin from that of the 
instrumental rationality. In fact, in a world in which instrumental and pragmatic rationality is 
spread everywhere and therefore human relationships are based on production and effectiveness, 
anamnestic rationality saves the memory of the losers and those defeated in history. The memory 
of the victims forces us to look at history not merely from the standpoint of the successful but 
from that of the conquered and victims (Metz 1980, 105).The past of the victims is full of 
meaning because it is recognised as an injustice that questions the present. These are dangerous 
memories because they visit the present and question it. These could be subversive memories 
with a liberating message for the future. It is necessary, therefore, to take a look at the 
vanquished and the defeated in history and develop a kind of anti-history. 
Furthermore, memory is fundamental for the constitution of the subject. In fact, it is a 
category of salvation for a threatened subjectivity. According to Metz, it is not by chance that 
any totalitarian rule begins with the destruction of the memory. Amnesia is indeed the 
consequence of mechanisms that control the dominant consciousness which equates everything 
outside of the pragmatic reason with superstition. On the contrary, these memories take the form 
of liberating narratives; they are essentially practical, and not merely argumentative.  
Universal Solidarity and Resistance 
As stated above, encounters between religions and cultures take shape thanks to the recognised 
moral and cultural authority of the suffering that disturbs the present. As a consequence of this 
approach, the framework of religious encounters is common practical work, a common response, 
and a common resistance to the sources of unjust suffering in the world. These sources could take 
the form of xenophobia, segregation, discrimination and ethnic-centred religiosity (Metz 1999b, 
233). This common resistance also points to the consequences of the instrumental rationality that 
increasingly causes human beings to vanish amid the systems of technology, economy, market 
and communication industries. Therefore, religion must be both a resistance against cultural 
amnesia and struggle for the recognition of the victims. Religion should be nothing else than the 
mouthpiece for the innocent victims of history who have been destroyed and can no longer speak 
for themselves. This common resistance is a universal responsibility for all religions towards the 
weak and those who do not count in society.  
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To Metz, universal responsibility is rooted in biblical traditions. Jesus looking first to the 
suffering and not to the sin is the grounding for the Christian perspective of the community of 
memory. The Christian community acts as a community of the imitatio Christi that is the 
community that follows the paths of Jesus. From a biblical perspective, even the suffering of 
enemies must be taken into account because it is not up to us to define clearly and to delimit the 
range of this responsibility or the breath of this caring. The neighbour of the Parable of the 
“Good Samaritan” “is never only the one whom we ourselves regard and accept as such” (Metz 
1999b, 230). 
This is the reason why Metz states that “the ethnic-cultural diversification of our world and 
its cultural polycentricism can be saved only in the face of a civilization of world unity without 
substance, if, in so-called intercultural exchange, the Geisteswissenschaften elaborate and 
hermeneutically secure the communicative superiority of the language of memory against the 
subject-less language or argumentation of Greek metaphysics and also of the predominant 
scientific language of Occidental rationality” (2005, 288). Certainly, this universal responsibility 
is close to Levinas’s religion as diakonia. From Metz’s and Levinas’s perspectives the most 
important factor is the way in which religion responds to the other’s sufferance and misery, and 
not the dogmas, administrative organization or preoccupations for the salvation of the soul.  
The Diacrony of the Diakonia: Religion as Service 
Levinas is convinced that it is possible to have a common framework in which “to think in a 
universal human society that incorporates the just people of every nation and every belief, with 
whom it is possible to achieve the final intimacy” (Levinas 1997, 163). Levinas’s approach to the 
dialogue of transcendence and the concept of religion as praxis in favour of social justice are 
ideas that after being elucidated will show an ethical way that leads to a common space of 
encounter for all cultures and religions.  
The Dialogue of Immanence 
In line with his criticism of Western thinking for its connatural tendency to assimilate knowledge 
with understanding, Levinas finds that dialogue, as an interchange of ideas and words in a 
symmetrical position, is an attempt to comprehend the other and thus to compress the other 
within the knowing consciousness. The fundamental conjuncture of the human is not the 
agreement of men around shared ideas. This is an exercise of knowing the other as an object and 
it is therefore a victory of the Hegelian absolute thought and the Cartesian “I think”. With irony, 
Levinas affirms that this is the “path of predilection of western humanism”, through which it 
wants to overcome violence (1998, 141). This is a dialogue of immanence because it keeps the 
other inside the subject’s consciousness in the dynamism of reciprocity in which the logic of 
commercial exchange prevails.  
In this kind of dialogue, Levinas recalls the danger of rhetoric: “the seducer knows all the 
ploys of language and all its ambiguities. He knows all the terms of dialectic. He exists precisely 
as a moment of human freedom, and the most dangerous of seducers is the one who carries you 
away with pious words to violence and contempt for the other man” (Levinas 1999, 177). In 
Levinas’s opinion the problem is not only the use of strategic dialogue to manipulate the co-
participants in the dialogue. Levinas’s claim is more profound insofar as it has to do with the 
ethical constitution of the subject in which there is an absolute separation between the “I” and the 
“you”, where the “I” feels the summons to respond for the other. For Levinas, the relationship 
that constantly reinstates the humanity of man is not the formal structure of reciprocal 
relationships in which the “I” is a “you” for the other and the “you” is discovered to be another 
“I”. Beyond the reversibility of the structure, Levinas wants to find asymmetrical ethical 
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relationships, which consists for the I in ‘going toward the Other where he is truly other’ 
(Levinas 1999, 88).  
Furthermore, the ethical transcendence that springs up in the interpersonal relationship 
indicates that the egalitarian and reciprocal relationship is not the ultimate structure of the 
human. The structure of the Buberian “I-Thou” is not the originator and cannot constitute the 
ethical. So, it is the infinity of the face to the other man, which is the living refutation of the 
pretension of the social totality, the economic and administrative structure, to be sufficient unto 
itself. 
The Dialogue of Transcendence 
Levinas transforms the meaning of the word dialogue from the way it is used in Western 
thinking. Dialogue is no more a mode of speaking but instead “a thinking of the unequal, a 
though thinking beyond the given [...] the modality according to which in dialogue, or more 
precisely in the ethics of dialogue, in my deaconships with respect to the other, I think more than 
I can grasp” (Levinas 1998, 151). By transforming the concept of dialogue, Levinas uncovers an 
ethical dimension that breaks up the spoken dialogue because the face-to-face already speaks 
before any word. 
From Levinas’s point of view, not only closeness but absolute transcendence or alterity of 
the “you” in regard to the “I” constitutes an authentic dialogue. The relationship with the other 
cannot be on the same level because there is no possibility of comparison between the subject 
and the other, that is, the last foundation of this relationship is not a common participation in 
being. This is because language is, according to Levinas, the ethical questioning of the self, 
coextensive with the manifestation of the other in the face. In this sense,  
language conditions thought -not language in its physical materiality, but language as an 
attitude of the same with regard to the Other, irreducible to the representation of the 
Other, irreducible to an intention of thought, irreducible to a consciousness of..., [...] 
Language is not enacted within a consciousness; it comes to me from the Other and 
reverberates in consciousness by putting it in question (Levinas 1969, 204).  
Furthermore, Levinas’s account of dialogue opens the way to transcendence and the infinite. 
In the face of the other is found the trace of the infinite. For Levinas, the problem of 
transcendence and God runs parallel with the problem of subjectivity irreducible to the essence, 
to the immanence. The Cartesian idea of infinity in which ideatum exceeds the idea is the clue to 
understand the transcendence of the other which, for Levinas, recalls the transcendence of God. 
This is the way to comprehend the inequality between the “I” and “you”. The service to the other 
is the first liturgy, the first prayer. Religion is service and not sacredness. Dialogue is rather a 
requirement of holiness; it is the testimony of the infinite and transcendence.  
Religion as Diakonia 
In a talk titled “Israel and Universalism” in response to Father Jean Danielou’s speech on the 
common foundations of Mediterranean Civilization, Levinas observes that the problem of truth in 
religious understanding is not a real problem for Jewish people because truth is not a problem of 
dogma but a problem of action (Levinas 1997, p. 176). In the meeting, Father Danielou had 
pointed out that religions, when confronted with others, are thorns between truth and charity. 
According to Levinas, religion is essentially a problem of justice and the dimension of the divine 
is open forth from the human face. This means that “God rises to his supreme and ultimate 
presence as correlative to the justice rendered unto men” (Levinas 1969, p. 78). The relationship 
with God cannot be accomplished in the ignorance of men. Therefore, the relationship with God 
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is established in the field of ethics and not in that of knowledge. In this sense, the relationship 
with God makes sense  
in the proximity of the other man who is stranger and possibly naked, destitute and 
undesiderable, but that it signifies also in his face that ask for me [...] all this must not be 
taken as ‘a new proof of the existence of God.’ [...] All this describes only the 
circumstance in which the meaning itself of the word ‘God’ comes to mind” (Levinas 
1998, 168).  
To Levinas, there is not a direct relationship with God; it is only possible to hear His call in 
the face of the Other who summons the subject from his/her destitution and neglect. This is the 
non-indifference before the ungraspable and unrepresentable, before the Other who appoints the 
subject “as unique and elected” without possible evasion (Levinas 1998, 177). In ethically 
understanding the relationship with God, Levinas is able to call “religion” the tie established 
between the same and the other without constituting a totality. In other words, religion means 
transcendence or proximity to the absolutely Other.  
From the discussion above, it can be understood that proximity is not simple tolerance, 
neutrality or non-aggression in relation to the Other. The consequence of Levinas’s stance is a 
universal responsibility. This is the essential message of Judaism which signifies universally. Far 
from ethnic particularism, Levinas is convinced that biblical messages signify all human thought, 
for all civilizations, because they can be recognised in peace and in the responsibility of one man 
for another. According to Levinas, the prophets preoccupied themselves with the poor, the 
widow, and the stranger and not with the immortality of the soul. Religion is a service, a 
diakonia, toward those who are in need. Therefore, religion as a struggle for a just society is 
universal because not interfering with dogmas makes sense even when the problems are 
insoluble.  
Concerning the insoluble problems, Levinas is aware that the mechanism of dialogue and 
looking for the most-common-denominator platform is sometimes insufficient. The problems 
persist and history cannot reconciliate everything that is waiting to be solved from reason, 
technology or dialogue. The better way is “a proximity that lasts even after dialogue has become 
impossible” (Levinas 1999, 87). This proximity is the only possible attitude towards the insoluble 
problems between cultures and religions, and proximity means a universal responsibility towards 
the material needs of the neighbour. 
In this regard, Levinas recalls a biblical and Talmudic tradition relating to Abraham. When 
Abraham received the three angels in his tent, he was convinced that the passers-by were 
Bedouins, from the Negrev Desert, that is Arabs. He ran toward them and called them “Your 
Lordships”. To Levinas, this is a sign that the heirs of Abraham are of all nations: “any man truly 
man is no doubt of the line of Abraham” (Levinas 1994, 99). The responsibility, that is, the 
obligation to feed the other is universal and has no limits. 
Conclusion 
In a world characterised by globalisation and the presence of different “modernities” (Eisenstadt 
2000), religion is able to provide a sense of cultural belonging and, at the same time, 
hermeneutical roots to justify violence both explicitly and subtly. In the face of dialogical reason, 
supposedly established in order to overcome the consequences of that violence, Catholic-
theologian Metz and Jewish-philosopher Levinas share the same preoccupation about the 
sufficiency of dialogical proceduralism. 
Having criticised the predominance of Greek thinking into theology, in the case of Metz, and 
into philosophy, for Levinas, they postulate an authority in order to support a strong horizon of 
comprehension for interhuman encounters. This is because transcendental theology and 
philosophy end in idealism and ignore the concrete reality in which there is multiplicity and from 
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which all meaning is established. Metz considers that suffering is the criteria to decipher where 
this authority comes from, and Levinas, in turn, appeals to the revelation of the Other that 
summons individual responsibility. While Metz grounds his claim historically, that is in the 
power of the past over the present, Levinas sets up his responsibility in a diachrony in which the 
relationship is saved from totalisation. Diachrony makes possible that interhuman relationships 
happen as a summons from above and not from the other side. The rapport is non simultaneous 
and non-present, it is beyond history and therefore irreducible to the synchrony of the same. 
Despite these theoretical differences, an agreement can be found. For Metz and Levinas, 
interhuman relationships and any possible interreligious encounters have a concrete response: the 
responsibility for the other who claims from its suffering and from its material needs. 
Apart from having the normal differences between a Catholic and a Jew, Metz and Levinas 
are also both profound believers in their respective religions, are both considered unorthodox and 
identify true religion with praxis in favour of the other. In religion, the horizontal dimension is 
the criteria for a true relationship with God. That is, the service to the neighbour is the way to 
reach God. This dictum is more radical in Levinas who considers that going towards God is 
meaningless unless seen in terms of the primary going towards the other person. The invisible 
God is present only in the face of the other. 
Therefore, this paper has suggested, from Levinasian phenomenology, that religion 
conceived as diakonia, and the invisibility of the face of God becoming present in the human face 
regardless of particular beliefs, are categories that would support a proposal for integration 
between different religious perspectives to overcome the weaknesses of dialogical reason. 
Furthermore, Metz’s call for universal justice stemming from memoria passionis could ground 
cultural and religious exchange in history. In this sense, the remembrance based on the suffering 
of victims overcomes the danger of the oblivion of past suffering and prevents a purely technical 
understanding of freedom and peace. The shift from Habermasian dialogical reason to prophetic 
reason in Metz and Levinas could be described as a shift from thinking with another to acting in 
favour of another. 
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